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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
WALKER V. STATE: FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE
NOT VIOLATED WHERE AN EMPLOYEE DOES NOT
DEMONSTRATE A SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATION OF
IN
THE
AREA
SEARCHED;
SEXUAL
PRIVACY
EXPLOITATION OF A CHILD CAN OCCUR WITHOUT ANY
PHYSICAL CONTACT OR CRIMINAL INTENT.
By Brittaney Fabiano
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the search of an employee's
desk did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights where the employee did
not demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched.
Walker v. State, 432 Md. 587, 613, 69 A.3d 1066, 1081-82 (2013). The
court additionally held that sexual abuse of a minor could be committed
through a series of actions that do not include physically touching the minor
or criminal intent, as long as the defendant took advantage of the minor for
his personal benefit. Id. at 622, 69 AJd at 1087.
On March 17,2010, a student-teacher found a sexually explicit note in the
desk of an eight-year-old female student at a Howard County elementary
school. The note appeared to be written by Karl Walker, Jr. ("Walker"), a
para-educator at the school. Police were given permission to search through
Walker's desk, which was located in a public and well-trafficked area,
unlocked, and labeled to suggest others may go through it. After searching
the drawers of his desk, police found a box containing numerous notes to
Walker from the same student. Approximately thirty sexually explicit notes
written by Walker to the student were later found.
Walker was indicted by a grand jury in Howard County for sexual abuse
of a minor and attempted sexual abuse of a minor. Walker filed a motion in
the Circuit Court for Howard County to suppress the evidence found in the
search of his desk, which was denied and his case proceeded as a bench trial.
At the close of all evidence, Walker's motion for judgment of acquittal was
denied, and Walker was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and attempted
sexual abuse of a minor.
Walker appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, alleging
the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence, and in
finding the evidence was legally sufficient to convict Walker. The
intermediate appellate court affirmed the holding of the trial court. Walker
then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began by denying Walker's argument
that his Fourth Amendment rights were infringed when police searched his
desk. Walker, 432 Md. at 604, 69 A.3d at 1077. A defendant must have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched to violate one's Fourth
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Amendment rights. Id. at 605, 69 A.3d at 1077 (citing a 'Connor v. Ortega,
480 u.s. 709, 715,107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987)). The facts of each search must
be analyzed to determine if an employee's expectation of privacy was
infringed. Walker, 432 Md. at 609, 69 A.3d at 1079 (citing O'Connor, 480
U.S. at 717-18, 107 S. Ct. 1492).
Employees may maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the work
place. Walker, 432 Md. at 608,69 A.3d at 1079. First, the employee "must
demonstrate an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the item or place
searched." Walker, 432 Md. at 605, 69 A.3d at 1077 (quoting Corbin v.
State, 428 Md. 488, 499, 52 A.3d 946 (2012)). Additionally, the expectation
of privacy must be one that society is willing to accept as reasonable.
Walker, 432 Md. at 605, 69 A.3d at 1077 (citing Corbin, 428 Md. at 499,52
A.3d 946). This two-part test is often referred to as the Katz test. Walker,
432 Md. at 605, 69 A.3d at 1077 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967)).
Applying the Katz test to the instant case, the court first analyzed whether
Walker demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in his desk.
Walker, 432 Md. at 612-13, 69 3 A.2d at 1081-82. The court acknowledged
that Walker did have some legitimate expectation of privacy because the
desk was assigned solely for his personal use, and there were no school
policies authorizing searches of employee desks. Walker, 432 Md. at 61112, 69 A.3d at 1081. The court also noted the location of the desk in an
open, well-trafficked area, the labels on the desk drawers, Walker's refusal to
lock the desk when keys were available, and Walker's failure to testify to his
subjective belief that the desk was for his personal use only. Id. at 611-12,
69 A.3d at 1081. In light of these facts, the court held that Walker did not
demonstrate that he maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in his
work desk. Id. at 612,69 A.3d at 1081. The concurrence further noted that
"[t]he circumstantial evidence was at best ambivalent and, in some respects,
suggested an invitation to others." Id. at 629, 69 A.3d at 1091 (McDonald,
J., concurring). Because Walker did not meet the first prong of the Katz test,
the search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Walker, 432 Md. at
612,69 A.3d at 1081.
Next, the court considered Walker's argument that the evidence presented
by the State was not legally sufficient to establish that Walker sexually
abused a minor under MARYLAND CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-602
("Section 3-602"). Walker, 432 Md. at 613-14, 69 A.3d at 1082. The court
reviewed the plain language of the statute, and determined that the language
notified the public of the legislature'S intent to include a wide scope of
actions considered to be either sexual molestation or exploitation of a minor.
Id. at 616, 69 A.3d at 1083. The term "exploitation" was not defined within
the statute; however, "exploitation" was previously defined as when "the
parent or person having temporary or permanent custody of a child took
advantage of or unjustly or improperly used the child for his or her own
benefit." Walker, 432 Md. at 619-20, 69 A.3d at 1086 (citing Degren v.
State, 352 Md. 400, 426, 722 A.2d 887 (1999)). The court interpreted this
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definition to include exploitation that occurs over a period of time, whether
or not the child was physically touched, as long as some sexual benefit is
derived from the conduct. Walker, 432 Md. at 622-23,69 A.3d at 1087-88.
The court viewed the facts in totality, and determined that the notes from
Walker to the student contained passionate and sexual undertones "satisfying
the 'sexual' element of exploitation." Walker, 432 Md. at 624, 69 A.3d at
1088. The court further established that Walker, throughout the course of
writing the notes, derived a personal, sexual benefit from the context of the
notes. fd. at 625, 69 A.3d at 1089. Therefore, the context of the notes
constituted sexual exploitation and was legally sufficient to support Walker's
conviction for sexual abuse of a minor. fd.
Finally, the court addressed Walker's argument that Section 3-602 did not
give notice regarding prohibited conduct and therefore violated his due
process rights, to rendering the statute void for vagueness. Walker, 432 Md.
at 626, 69 A.3d at 1089. A statute will be void for vagueness if it does not
adequately explain the conduct that will render a person liable to the statute's
penalties. fd. (citing McFarlin v. State, 409 Md. 391, 410, 975 A.2d 862
(2009)). The court noted that if a reasonable person must guess to determine
the meaning of a statute it is insufficiently explicit. Walker, 432 Md. at 26,
69 A.3d at 1089-90 (citing McFarlin, 409 Md. at 411, 975 A.2d 862).
However, if the terms in controversy can be determined through common
law, judicial determinations, or the words themselves, then the statute is not
void. Walker, 432 Md. at 626,69 A.3d at 1090 (citing McFarlin, 409 Md. at
411,975 A.2d 862). Although Section 3-602 uses broad language, the court
concluded that the statute "strikes a careful compromise between the need for
specificity and the desire of lawmakers to craft a statute that can target the
ever-shifting manner in which some people will target and abuse children."
Walker, 432 Md. at 626-27, 69 A.3d at 1090. The court upheld Walker's
conviction. ld.
In Walker, the Court of Appeals of Maryland emphasized the defendant's
burden of proving a subjective expectation of privacy in the work place. The
court also interpreted the scope of sexual abuse of a minor to include
nonphysical conduct over a period of time that was conducted for the benefit
of the defendant. This ruling interpreted the statutory language of the
Criminal Law Article in a broad manner to help protect the legitimate State
interest of protecting children from abuse.

